by zer0x0ne — on


some of my favourite websites: null byte the hackers news hackaday pen test partners cso online infosec writers security week xkcd

wonder how to - null byte

Retrieved title: Null Byte « WonderHowTo, 1 item(s)
How to Phish for Social Media & Other Account Passwords with Blackeye

Social media accounts are a favorite target for hackers, and the most effective tactics for attacking accounts on websites like Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter are often based on phishing. These password-stealing attacks rely on tricking users into entering their passwords into a convincing fake webpage, and they have become increasingly easy to make thanks to tools like BlackEye. BlackEye is a tool to rapidly generate phishing pages that target social media websites, making it much easier to phish targets of opportunity on the same network. After redirecting a target to the phishing page... more

the hackers news

Retrieved title: The Hacker News, 1 item(s)
European Central Bank Shuts Down 'BIRD Portal' After Getting Hacked

The European Central Bank (ECB) confirmed Thursday that it had been hit by a cyberattack that involved attackers injecting malware into one of its websites and potentially stealing contact information of its newsletter subscribers. Headquartered in Germany, the European Central Bank (ECB) is the central bank of the 19 European Union countries which have adopted the euro and is itself


Retrieved title: Hackaday, 1 item(s)
Adding A Co-Processor To Help SNES Games With Slowdown

The Super Nintendo port of Gradius III is notable for being close to the arcade original, with its large, bright and colorful graphics. However, due to the limitation of the console’s hardware, the port is also well known for having constant slowdowns during gameplay, particularly during later sections. [Vitor] hacked away at the game and made a patched version of the ROM use a co-processor to eliminate those issues.

The slowdown seen here in Gradius is not uncommon to SNES players, many games of that era suffer from it when several sprites appear on the screen at once. This is partially due to the aging CPU Nintendo chose, supposedly in order to maintain NES backwards compatibility before the idea got scrapped. Unable to complete its tasks by the time the next frame needs to be shown, the hardware skips frames to let the processor catch up before it can continue. This is perceived as the aforementioned slowdown.

Around the later stage of the SNES’s life, games started using additional chips inside the cartridges in order to enhance the console’s performance. One of them is the SA1, which is a co-processor with the same core as the main CPU, only with a higher clock rate. By using it, games had more time to run through the logic and graphics manipulation before the next frame. What [Vitor] did was port those parts of Gradius III to the SA1, essentially making it just like any other enhanced cartridge from back in the day.

Unlike previous efforts we’ve seen to overclock the SNES by giving it a longer blanking time, this method works perfectly on real unmodified hardware. You can see the results of his efforts after the break, particularly around stage 2 where several bubbles fill the screen on the second video.

[Via Ars Technica, thanks Damian for the tip!]

infosec writers

Retrieved title: InfoSecWriters.com, 1 item(s)
The Effectiveness of Governance and Regulatory Bodies in Protecting Information Security

Contributed by James Robinson
Appropriate and proper understanding and of IT security should be considered an essential and pertinent requirement within any modern business amongst its executives and employees. But, as we have seen throughout recent news, this has not been the case for many companies. This text explores the effectives of governance and regulations as it relates to protecting our information security. This text focuses on the different organizations’ businesses have implemented with hopes of increasing security standards. The articles, figures and tables used in this paper will further elaborate the importance of these organizations and practices within companies.
This document is in PDF format. To view it click here.

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pen test partners

Retrieved title: Pen Test Partners, 1 item(s)
Dating apps that track users from home to work and everywhere in-between


  • We were able to precisely locate and track the users of four major dating apps, potentially putting at risk 10 million users
  • This risk level is elevated for the LGBT+ community who may use these apps in countries with poor human rights where they may be subject to arrest and persecution.
  • App makers must do more to prevent location leakage in their apps and properly communicate this risk to their users.

During our research into dating apps (see also our work on 3fun) we looked at whether we could identify the location of users.

Previous work on Grindr has shown that it is possible to trilaterate the location of its users. Trilateration is like triangulation, except that it takes into account altitude, and is the algorithm GPS uses to derive your location, or when locating the epicentre of earthquakes, and uses the time (or distance) from multiple points.

Triangulation is pretty much the same as trilateration over short distances, say less than 20 miles.

Many of these apps return an ordered list of profiles, often with distances in the app UI itself:

By supplying spoofed locations (latitude and longitude) it is possible to retrieve the distances to these profiles from multiple points, and then triangulate or trilaterate the data to return the precise location of that person.

We created a tool to do this that brings together multiple apps into one view. With this tool, we can find the location of users of Grindr, Romeo, Recon, (and 3fun) – together this amounts to nearly 10 million users globally.

Here’s a view of central London:

And zooming in closer we can find some of these app users in and around the seat of power in the UK:

By simply knowing a person’s username we can track them from home, to work. We can find out where they socialise and hang out. And in near real-time.

Asides from exposing yourself to stalkers, exes, and crime, de-anonymising individuals can lead to serious ramifications. In the UK, members of the BDSM community have lost their jobs if they happen to work in “sensitive” professions like being doctors, teachers, or social workers. Being outed as a member of the LGBT+ community could also lead to you using your job in one of many states in the USA that have no employment protection for employees’ sexuality.

But being able to identify the physical location of LGBT+ people in countries with poor human rights records carries a high risk of arrest, detention, or even execution. We were able to locate the users of these apps in Saudi Arabia for example, a country that still carries the death penalty for being LGBT+.

It should be noted that the location is as reported by the person’s phone in most cases and is thus heavily dependent on the accuracy of GPS. However, most smartphones these days rely on extra data (like phone masts and Wi-Fi networks) to derive an augmented position fix. In our testing, this data was sufficient to show us using these data apps at one end of the office versus the other.

The location data collected and stored by these apps is also very precise – 8 decimal places of latitude/longitude in some cases. This is sub-millimetre precision ­and not only unachievable in reality but it means that these app makers are storing your exact location to high degrees of accuracy on their servers. The trilateration/triangulation location leakage we were able to exploit relies solely on publicly-accessible APIs being used in the way they were designed for – should there be a server compromise or insider threat then your exact location is revealed that way.


We contacted the various app makers on 1st June with a 30 day disclosure deadline:

  • Romeo replied within a week and said that they have a feature that allows you to move yourself to a nearby position rather than your GPS fix.
    This is not a default setting and has to be found enabled by digging deep into the app: https://www.planetromeo.com/en/care/location/
  • Recon replied with a good response after 12 days. They said that they intended to address the issue “soon” by reducing the precision of location data and using “snap to grid”. Recon said they fixed the issue this week.
  • 3fun’s was a train wreck: Group sex app leaks locations, pics and personal details. Identifies users in White House and Supreme Court
  • Grindr didn’t respond at all. They have previously said that your location is not stored “precisely” and is more akin to a “square on an atlas”. We didn’t find this at all – Grindr location data was able to pinpoint our test accounts down to a house or building, i.e. exactly where we were at that time.

We think it is utterly unacceptable for app makers to leak the precise location of their customers in this fashion. It leaves their users at risk from stalkers, exes, criminals, and nation states.

Contrary to Romeo’s statement (https://www.planetromeo.com/en/care/location/), there are technical means to obfuscating a person’s precise location whilst still leaving location-based dating usable.

  • Collect and store data with less precision in the first place: latitude and longitude with three decimal places is roughly street/neighbourhood level.
  • Use “snap to grid”: with this system, all users appear centred on a grid overlaid on a region, and an individual’s location is rounded or “snapped” to the nearest grid centre. This way distances are still useful but obscure the real location.
  • Inform users on first launch of apps about the risks and offer them real choice about how their location data is used. Many will choose privacy, but for some, an immediate hookup might be a more attractive option, but this choice should be for that person to make.
  • Apple and Google could potentially provide an obfuscated location API on handsets, rather than allow apps direct access to the phone’s GPS. This could return your locality, e.g. “Buckingham”, rather than precise co-ordinates to apps, further enhancing privacy.

Dating apps have revolutionised the way that we date and have particularly helped the LGBT+ and BDSM communities find each other.

However, this has come at the expense of a loss of privacy and increased risk.

It is difficult to for users of these apps to know how their data is being handled and whether they could be outed by using them. App makers must do more to inform their users and give them the ability to control how their location is stored and viewed.

cso online

Retrieved title: CSO Online, 1 item(s)
IDG Contributor Network: Are you being tracked through a Bluetooth security vulnerability?

Research published this month by a team from Boston University has revealed a number of flaws in the way that Bluetooth Low Energy functionality is implemented on a wide range of consumer devices.

These devices – including both Apple and Microsoft Bluetooth devices – advertise their availability on open channels, and this opens the way for global device tracking. With spyware in the IoT becoming a major source of concern for cybersecurity researchers, this new research indicates that the problem may be even larger than we imagined.

To read this article in full, please click here

security week

Retrieved title: SecurityWeek RSS Feed, 1 item(s)
Iowa Grocery Chain Investigating Possible Hack of Payment Processing Systems

A West Des Moines, Iowa-based grocery chain that also operates restaurants, fuel-pumps and drive-thru coffee shops is warning its customers about a security incident involving some of its payment card systems.

read more


Retrieved title: xkcd.com, 1 item(s)
Serena Versus the Drones

After the test, she said that if she had a choice, she wouldn’t defend herself against drones using a tennis ball and racket, though she would absolutely pick them over other sports equipment. But, she added, "Drones don't bother me."